[Duterview] 'Border Conflict' as a Political Tool for the Thai Military and Far-Rights

Gunfire is echoing once again around the Preah Vihear Temple on the border between Thailand and Cambodia. This conflict, which evokes the nightmares of the 2008 border dispute, appears on the surface to be a clash of national pride over territory. However, a look inside reveals a complex web of internal Thai political engineering. Beyond a simple border dispute, the conservative royalist elite and military factions have once again dealt with the old card of "nationalism" to solidify their vested interests.

In this "Duterview" (Dunia Interview) in-depth interview segment, we analyze how the recent armed conflict on the Thai-Cambodian border was orchestrated and escalated. In particular, we expose the military's strategy to neutralize the civilian government’s will for diplomatic resolution and seize full control of crisis management. We track the mechanism by which far-right nationalist narratives spread via social media have diverted the public's gaze from the fundamental issue of domestic political failure into an exhausting frenzy of patriotic nationalism.

Furthermore, we critically examine the "Thaksin is a Cambodian Traitor" frame targeting the special relationship between the Thaksin family of Thailand and the Hun Sen family of Cambodia, as well as the calculations of politicians playing the patriotism card ahead of the Thai general election scheduled for February 2026. Economic losses, such as trade deficits due to border closures and the burden of defense spending from armed clashes, are snowballing alongside rising casualties. On December 18, 2025, Dunia reporter Seulki Lee held a video interview with Supalak Ganjanakhundee, a founding member of the Thai think tank 'Institute for Strategic Policy' and a journalist, to discuss realistic solutions to end this exhaustive territorial dispute.

What is the difference between the 2008 conflict and the conflict that occurred around the Preah Vihear Temple this year?

In fact, the model is almost the same, but the scale is different. This conflict is causing much greater damage than before. However, in my view, they are nearly identical. This is because the anachronistic border issue between Thailand and Cambodia is used as a tool by conservative elites, the establishment, and right-wing groups to ignite conflict whenever they want to gain political advantage. I would say this was perpetrated by right-wing factions again.

If you closely followed Thai politics last year, you would know that they initially raised claims over Thailand's exclusive continental shelf and used the Ta Moan Thom Temple and the Chong Bok area as triggers to provoke conflict with Cambodia. The military exploited that situation. They likely knew the situation very well and may have intentionally highlighted and intensified the brief 15-minute clash in the Chong Bok border area of Ubon Ratchathani on May 28.

How do you view the military's response to this border dispute?

The generals highlighted national security issues and forced the then-Pheu Thai government to approve border restrictions in early June in response to Cambodia's so-called "aggressive attitude." Later, on June 8, when the Cambodian side agreed to a regional commanders' meeting to discuss de-escalation and a return to the status quo, the Thai side refused to respond positively. As I recall, the government convened the National Security Council in June and granted field commanders (the 2nd and 1st Army Commanders) the authority to impose additional restrictions.

On June 8, field commanders held a regional meeting and agreed to fill in trenches and withdraw, but there was no response from the Thai side, and the border remained restricted.

Ultimately, that angered former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. Looking at the call between Hun Sen and then-Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn, the core issue Hun Sen emphasized was the need to open the border. Paetongtarn tried to say "We can do that," but the military opposed opening the border, and Paetongtarn even went so far as to say that the generals were a force opposing her government. This content clearly shows the role the military plays when utilizing border disputes as a political tool for strategic gain.

Because the military does not allow border crossings and limits opening hours, crossing the border has become much more difficult. That was the start of the conflict. Next, a landmine accident occurred. The landmine is a big question for me. As you know, the border area with Cambodia is land filled with anti-personnel mines laid during the ten years of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

Both Thailand and Cambodia are signatories to the Ottawa Convention. They have an obligation and a promise to remove landmines, but they haven't finished yet. However, when a Thai soldier stepped on a mine and was injured, Thailand declared a severance of diplomatic ties with Cambodia, and Cambodia reacted even more negatively, downgrading diplomatic relations from the ambassadorial level to the level of minister or secretary. With diplomatic channels cut, the military took control of everything. The military took over crisis management. While the military does everything, the government just sits there and approves what the military wants.

I heard that the far-right nationalist wave in the media also plays a role. What is your take?

A very important point is that the military sets the atmosphere and narrative through the media. The media landscape has changed. They mobilize social media, their affiliates, and non-state actors to incite nationalist sentiment and anti-Cambodian feelings throughout Thailand. The military manages the narrative through the media. Now, even if you look at English-language outlets like 'The Nation' or the 'Bangkok Post,' you can see everything being reported from a military or tactical warfare perspective. Numerous military narratives flowed through the media at that time. In that sense, it can be said that the military controls everything—from crisis management to the narrative of being the "protector" of the country from external aggression or Cambodian attacks.

Far-right activists like Sondhi Limthongkul or the 'Student and Citizen Network for Thailand's Reform' are prominent. They seem to be trying to revive the 'lost territory' narrative, which looks like a form of historical revisionism. It seems they are not just making simple territorial claims but are trying to undermine the legitimacy of civilian institutions and pave the way for the military to intervene in the conflict and domestic politics. How do you view the movements of these far-right groups and activists?

In practical terms, I don't think their movements are very powerful unless supported by the military. However, they are very skilled at touching upon national narratives, especially the "territorial loss" narrative. They use "historical pain" as a political tool to heighten emotions among Thais and to justify the actions of the military rather than themselves. They try to explain everything through the historical context of losing territory to Cambodia during the French colonial era.

They believe that the Cambodian territories occupied by Thailand for five years during the Phibun Songkhram era during World War II belonged to Thailand, and they argue that the history of the Thai Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam at that time must be revised. That’s why I call it "historical pain." Specifically, they claim that the territory related to the Preah Vihear Temple was lost. So, whenever Cambodia mentions the International Court of Justice (ICJ), far-right nationalist groups exploit that pain. They use this as a political tool to trigger nationalism and anti-Cambodian sentiment within Thailand and to make people support the military.

In South Korea's case, far-right political groups are growing, and some even praised the declaration of martial law last year. This is becoming a trend and gaining significant support. Is there a similar trend in Southeast Asia?

I think it is much the same in Southeast Asia. Nationalist narratives are revised and reused every time a political tool is needed to cover our anxieties and mask historical pain. That is the case in Thailand. Thailand is constantly experiencing political regression and economic decline. We are facing government failure in every sector.

Look at the Anutin government. Anutin failed to crack down on scam centers. So, nationalism and far-right ideas raise their heads again. It’s to divert our attention away from domestic leadership failure. It’s time to blame everything on Cambodia. From a Thai perspective, Cambodia is portrayed as the center of all evil. The right wing uses nationalist narratives for this purpose.

This also happens in Cambodia. Briefly, Hun Sen wants to cover up the failure to crack down on scam centers. This is because Cambodia was identified in a UN report as one of the major scam centers in Southeast Asia and is under pressure from China to crack down. So, they use armed conflict in the border area to distract attention. In Myanmar, the military emphasizes national unity and its own role to suppress the opposition and dissidents. In the Philippines, right-wing narratives appear during conflicts with China over the South China Sea. As far as I know, this trend is appearing across Southeast Asia.

Currently, the Pheu Thai-led government is under fire for being too close to the Cambodian Hun Sen family, trapped in the frame of "selling out the country." Why do you think this frame still resonates with the public?

To some extent, it is persuasive to Thai people. This is because these two families, Thaksin and Hun Sen, are very close and have maintained a reciprocal relationship for a long time. Their relationship began when Hun Sen came to power after the historic 1993 elections. At that time, Thaksin was a businessman investing in western Cambodia. Later, when Thaksin became Prime Minister, anti-Thai riots broke out in Phnom Penh, and the Thai embassy and businesses were attacked; at that time, Thaksin blamed Hun Sen for mishandling the situation.

Eventually, Hun Sen settled the situation and provided compensation. Even when Thaksin was ousted in the 2006 coup and there were Red Shirt protests and crackdowns in Bangkok, the relationship continued. When the Thaksin family regained power through elections, Thaksin needed to repay Hun Sen's help. So, he requested cooperation to jointly develop hydrocarbon resources in the disputed maritime boundary area in the Gulf of Thailand. We had already signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2001 and proposed resuming negotiations.

However, Thaksin could not respond positively because of the issue raised by right-wing groups: "Thaksin is entangled with Cambodian interests, and his associates are interested in the profits of the Gulf of Thailand." So, when the right wing raises this issue, it works on people. They claim he is pursuing private interests at the expense of national interests. Consequently, the Pheu Thai government has failed to advance any cooperation despite numerous MOUs for mutual benefit in economy, trade, infrastructure, labor, and education. Everything has met opposition from factions within the right wing, especially the military. While they do not oppose it openly, they used right-wing organizations to promote the idea that they would not trade over the Overlapping Claims Area (OCA) in the Gulf of Thailand. They demand the abolition of the 2001 MOU, which is the framework for maritime dispute negotiations. This explains why the Pheu Thai government cannot gain trust in dealings with Cambodia.

The leaked phone conversation between Paetongtarn and Hun Sen seems to have become the target of excessive 'witch hunts' by digital far-right forces. It seems the synergy between digital far-right nationalism and anti-Shinawatra sentiment has changed the political landscape.

It seems someone intentionally leaked that phone conversation. Hun Sen was very angry and demanded that the border be reopened to resume trade and border crossings during the conflict. This is because Cambodians rely heavily on Thai consumer goods and also need to sell their agricultural products. It's a scale of 1 billion baht(approximately USD 32million) a month. A whopping 1 billion baht a month is a huge loss for both sides. So, Hun Sen was truly angry at Paetongtarn's reaction. The content of that call reflects such a situation. However, for the right wing, that call confirmed their belief that one should never trust Hun Sen or Cambodian leaders. They see it as them trying to blackmail us. Legally speaking, there is no problem with a Prime Minister having such a conversation. Paetongtarn can speak that way to a former Prime Minister. Diplomatically, it might be a breach of etiquette to call the father rather than the current Prime Minister, Hun Manet. Legally, the Thai courts also said there was no problem. However, it becomes an issue in terms of national dignity, integrity, and the ethics of a politician. This is true when measured against the standards of Thai politicians under our constitution. That’s why it became a big fight.

Will this synergy between digital far-right nationalism and anti-Shinawatra sentiment affect current or future Thai-Cambodian diplomatic relations?

Absolutely. It has become very difficult for Thailand to re-establish diplomatic communication channels with Cambodia. Even now, diplomatic relations remain downgraded. The ambassador is still in Bangkok, and the Phnom Penh embassy is operated only at the level of a low-ranking secretary. There is no formal diplomatic communication. We are communicating through ASEAN, the US, and China. When trying to implement a ceasefire agreement, we have to rely on Prime Minister Anwar (Malaysia) or sometimes a call from President Trump. We don't have our own diplomatic channels.

Our ministers meet at the UN or ASEAN meetings, but they cannot decide anything on their own. They have to wait for government instructions, and the government observes the situation rather than giving full authority to diplomats. There are many bilateral mechanisms, such as the General Border Committee (GBC) and Regional Border Committee (RBC), but they are not functioning properly due to a lack of political will for a peaceful resolution.

Both sides rely on military action rather than diplomatic methods. For now, it is very difficult to restart diplomatic channels. We have to wait until both sides agree to a ceasefire and return to a normal track. We are using diplomatic relations as a tool to justify military actions. They only insist on their own legitimacy at the UN or the Ottawa Convention. They haven't found a common ground to sit down for true peace.

The Thai conservatives always portray the monarchy as the ultimate guardian of the land. Do you see any changes compared to the past in how the conservative movement links border issues by borrowing the authority of the monarchy?

This time, Koon Bunsin, a former 2nd Army Commander, once mentioned that field operation status should be reported to the King daily. When people said, "You shouldn't say such things," he stopped mentioning it. However, we know very well that the military reports to the monarchy, not the government. They are subordinate to the monarchy and act as protectors of the monarchy and the sovereign system. To us, the State and the Monarchy are the same. Protecting the country is synonymous with protecting the throne. In that narrative, siding with the military automatically becomes loyalty to the King. The monarchy is a core institution of Thailand. In the military's narrative, the State and the Monarchy are one.

Does Prime Minister Anutin currently have the support of far-right forces in Thailand?

Anutin himself is right-wing. He has a good relationship with the monarchy, always listens to the military, and never resists them. Anutin needs the protection of the military. He cannot command the military, but the military commands his government. Looking at border management alone, the military is handling it. If it were a civilian government, it should have a voice regarding the timing of opening the border, but it doesn't.

The border issue is also linked to trade, economic development, and the supply chains of Korean or Japanese investors. We should use the eastern coast of Thailand as a production base and utilize infrastructure connecting Cambodia and Vietnam. However, the Prime Minister seems to think only of military operations. Border security and management must consider many factors, including economy, trade, human exchange, and foreign investment. Recently, Thai authorities blocked and seized about 100 petroleum trucks trying to cross the border from Thailand to Laos. This is due to a paranoid anti-military attitude. They suspected that the fuel would be re-exported to Cambodia. Economically, it makes no sense. The Laotian minister protested, saying they have been good customers buying Thai fuel for a long time, so why block it? They don't even export it to Cambodia. This is exactly what paranoia looks like.

Prime Minister Anutin visited the border personally and issued a hawkish message. It seems he intends to use this patriotic message in the next general election.

Yes. Usually, this is called a "Kharki election." It refers to a phenomenon where a leader calls for national unity and defense during a war to gain political support. Anutin will also try to use nationalist sentiment in the February election with the same strategy. But I see it differently. They say they protect and love the country, but what happens if they can't compensate people who lost their homes and property to war? As the election approaches, people will ask, "When will the war end?" Anutin must prove that we can live in peace with Cambodians. This is because we are neighbors and cannot be separated from each other.

Comparing this to the 2008 border dispute case, the Democrat Party's Abhisit government also used the nationalism card against Cambodia but eventually lost to the Pheu Thai Party in the election. I doubt whether Anutin can benefit from using nationalism this time either. He promised to "end it soon," but if he cannot provide reality, people will start complaining, "Where did my income go? Who will compensate for my destroyed house?"

Local residents are already asking when they can return to a normal life. With only about a month left until the election, I believe military operations must end before the New Year. During the month of January, the government must normalize everything, open the border, and send people home. If Anutin finds a budget for compensation and manages it well, he might benefit, but if he fails, nationalism will not help.

What is the current economic loss caused by the Thai-Cambodian border closure and armed conflict?

It is difficult to understand or explain why the current government and military are choosing military confrontation even at the expense of economic interests. Closing the Cambodian border results in a loss of 60 billion baht(approximately USD 1.93 billion)a month (including agriculture and all trade sectors), and military operations cost 1 to 2 billion baht a day. The cost per flight hour for F-16 fighters is enormous. Why fight Cambodia at the cost of the economy and border residents? No rational policy is visible. Thailand's current response is simply, "We will not talk; if you want to talk, kneel before us first."

What would be the most realistic path to resolve the conflict?

We might have to rely on the US or China. If Washington fails, China will intervene. China has massive interests, such as a naval base in southern Cambodia, and it also sells weapons like submarines to the Thai military. Beijing is in a position to say, "Don't fight, live in peace." They can supply weapons to both sides, after all.

Another point is that it will end when Thailand can no longer afford the damage. Most of the soldiers dying on the battlefield are low-ranking soldiers from poor rural backgrounds. Economic growth continues to slow down. When the Thai people can no longer endure the suffering, they will demand the government stop. The Chief of the General Staff wants to destroy Cambodia's military capability, but our military doesn't have that ability, and the cost is too high. Ultimately, we must make a rational calculation that we can no longer afford the dispute. Tools to solve it peacefully based on international law, treaties, and maps are already in place. All that is needed is the political will of Phnom Penh and Bangkok.

All mechanisms and channels are there, and there is support from the US and China. Everyone wants peace. People have died, houses have been destroyed, and incomes have been cut. People who have been in shelters for over a week are desperate for income. Especially now, it is the time for high school students to prepare for university entrance exams. Final exams are also approaching. Students need a peaceful situation to read books and prepare for exams. Thailand cannot afford further destruction and damage.

Interview: Seulki Lee skidolma@thedunia.org