[Beyond DUNIA] The 2026 Thailand General Election and the Rise of "Smart Authoritarianism"

By Lee Jung-woo (Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science and International Relations, Korea University; Specialist in Thai Politics)

The Emergence of Smart Authoritarianism

When thinking of Thailand, the image of a tourist destination is often followed immediately by the political context of the military coup. Since 1932, there have been 12 successful coups—statistically, one every 7.8 years. Anyone with a cursory knowledge of Thai political history can easily identify the cause: the collusion between the monarchy and the military. The King holds command over the armed forces, while the cabinet lacks the power to control them. American scholar Paul Chambers describes this as a "parallel state," where an alliance of non-elected elite-military forces and a popularly elected authority run along parallel lines without ever converging. The coups of 2006 and 2014 were both aimed at Thaksin Shinawatra and his clan, who wielded immense influence over Thai politics.

However, the 2006 coup failed to oust the Thaksin family from politics. Instead, the Thaksin-aligned People’s Power Party won the 2007 election held under military rule, and the Pheu Thai Party, another Thaksin affiliate, secured victory in the 2011 general election. Following the 2014 coup, the military entered a long period of recalibration. Realizing they could not win elections despite two coups, the military required time and a "smart" strategy. The chosen tactic was to bypass overt coups in favor of sophisticated maneuvers within the parliamentary system—such as subtly inducing the failure of the leading party’s prime ministerial nomination or mobilizing the Constitutional Court to dissolve parties and ban politicians from political activity. This was a refined strategy: it avoided international condemnation associated with coups while maintaining a veneer of legitimacy through institutional mechanisms. This "Smart Authoritarianism" first manifested during the 2019 general election, resulting in the birth of a prime minister from the military ranks.

The 2023 general election provided the first major case study of Smart Authoritarianism successfully blocking the top party from taking power. The Move Forward Party (formerly the Future Forward Party, which emerged in 2019 and was dissolved by the Constitutional Court in 2020) rose to become the largest party under the leadership of Pita Limjaroenrat. Despite winning 151 seats, the party failed to secure enough votes to appoint a prime minister. This was largely due to its campaign promise to amend Article 112 of the Criminal Code (the Lèse-majesté law). Conservative parties, excluding Pheu Thai and a few others, viewed this as a threat to the monarchy and national security and refused to align with them. Furthermore, the military-appointed Senate withheld its support. Consequently, the mandate to form a government passed to the runner-up, the Pheu Thai Party, and the will of the first-place voters was frustrated. Subsequently, in 2024, the Move Forward Party was dissolved by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that its pledge to amend Article 112 endangered national security. This marked the beginning of a sophisticated era where institutions, rather than tanks, are used to dissolve opposition and extend the tenure of the ruling establishment.

Conservative Strategy (1): Weaponizing Nationalism via Thai-Cambodian Conflict

The military utilized the "parallel state" structure to pressure the government through armed conflict with Cambodia. Paetongtarn Shinawatra attempted to resolve the crisis by speaking with Hun Sen, President of the Cambodian Senate. However, the release of a call transcript—in which she referred to Hun Sen as "Uncle" and appeared hostile toward the Thai military commander—sparked a backlash. The Bhumjaithai Party, then part of the coalition, immediately withdrew and pivoted to criticizing the administration. Subsequently, then-Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for violating ethical standards. Bhumjaithai, as the third-largest party, then formed a new coalition, promising to dissolve the cabinet and hold elections four months later. The People’s Party (the successor to Move Forward) accepted this proposal and voted for Bhumjaithai’s candidate, Anutin Charnvirakul, leading to the birth of a conservative cabinet.

As highlighted in interviews by Dunia Editor-in-Chief Lee Seul-gi, border issues are long-standing but are frequently ignited by conservative elites as political tools. Through these conflicts, the military emphasizes national security threats, pressures the civilian government for a hardline response, and expands its role by declaring martial law and seizing control of border regions. This shifts the initiative in crisis management back to the military. In international relations, the "Diversionary Theory of War" posits that leaders facing domestic instability intentionally provoke external conflicts to distract the public and bolster internal unity. Such external clashes were utilized as a campaign strategy. The general election on February 8, 2026, resulted in a victory for conservative parties leveraging nationalism. Bhumjaithai and the Phalang Pracharath (Kla Tham) parties won not only in border regions but also in the Northeast (Isan) and Northern regions, traditionally strongholds of the Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai Party.

Conservative Strategy (2): Localized Clientelism Networks

A major theme in this election was corruption, often referred to in Thailand as "grey politics." Parties campaigned on the image of purging "grey politicians" and maintaining purity. However, clientelism—networks of patronage—remained rampant in regional politics, particularly among conservative parties. The growth of the Bhumjaithai Party is rooted in its ability to build power through networks with local politicians. As the former Minister of Interior, Anutin Charnvirakul provided large-scale "pork barrel" benefits to local leaders, cementing these ties. In an interview with The Guardian, Thai political scientist Dr. Napon Jatusripitak noted that Bhumjaithai’s victory was built on this traditional patronage and "money politics," which effectively mobilized conservative voters. By combining nationalism with these local networks, Bhumjaithai overwhelmed its rivals in constituency-based seats.

The effectiveness of clientelism was further bolstered by the silence of voters exhausted by the border conflicts instigated by the military and conservatives. During her reporting on the Thai-Cambodian border, Editor Lee Seul-gi met a displaced person who expressed deep disillusionment, stating that no party had offered a concrete plan to resolve the conflict and that they would abstain from voting. Indeed, the absence of clear peace-building pledges may have contributed to the conservative victory by depressing the voices of those most affected.

Threats to Smart Authoritarianism

Based on these strategies, the Bhumjaithai Party secured victory with 193 seats. The reformist People’s Party took 118, Pheu Thai 74, Kla Tham 58, and the Democrat Party 25, ranking second through fifth respectively. Despite this conservative win, the landscape is not entirely favorable for Smart Authoritarianism. Two major threats remain.

First, Thai voters cast two ballots: one for a local constituency representative and one for a political party (proportional representation). In this election, significant "split voting" was observed in the North and Northeast. In the North, voters frequently chose Bhumjaithai for the constituency but the People’s Party for the party list. In the Northeast, they split their votes between Bhumjaithai (constituency) and Pheu Thai (party list). While the nationalist strategy worked to an extent, this trend poses a long-term threat. If conservative parties fail to maintain nationalist fervor or deliver tangible social policies for economic development, they face certain defeat in future elections. Historically, Thaksin-aligned parties succeeded by securing strong support from farmers and low-income voters. Currently, Bhumjaithai offers little vision beyond the "smart" nationalist maneuvers of the authoritarian establishment.

Second, the People’s Party swept every single constituency in Bangkok. The Bangkok middle class, once a bastion of pro-monarchy support during the 2006 coup era, has undergone a shift. Because Thaksin’s base was in the North and Northeast, the Bangkok middle class previously welcomed coups as a counter-measure. Now, however, this same demographic has chosen the People’s Party as their top pick for both constituency and party-list seats. This suggests that without the crutch of nationalism and local patronage networks, Bhumjaithai lacks a "hardcore" support base. The combination of split voting in rural areas and the People’s Party’s dominance in the capital indicates that the conservative foundation is thin. While they won this time through institutional manipulation rather than a coup, a "higher mountain" awaits them. It remains to be seen how Smart Authoritarianism will evolve further to survive these challenges.

Tasks for the Opposition

Prior to this election, the People’s Party made a tactical error. Following the dismissal of PM Paetongtarn, they entered a compromise that allowed a conservative government to emerge. By supporting Anutin Charnvirakul’s nomination (though not joining the cabinet), they faced fierce criticism from their supporters. During the campaign, the party leadership apologized for this choice and vowed not to align with Bhumjaithai again. Fortunately for them, this compromise did not seem to significantly alienate voters; the Bangkok middle class, unable to support the Thaksin faction, still saw the People’s Party as the only alternative.

However, the reformist People’s Party must now reflect on how to reach voters more deeply through policy. First, the Bangkok middle class and the younger generation are largely immune to nationalism and clientelism. The party must consider how to effectively provide public goods and solve societal issues—specifically Bangkok’s severe air pollution, the quality of public transit, and the government’s capacity for disaster management. Second, they must figure out how to address the reformist demands of the youth. Since being rebuilt from the dissolved Move Forward Party, the People’s Party has remained silent on political reforms like Article 112 to avoid further legal attacks. This has created an identity crisis. Dr. Akanit Horatanakun, a Thai political scientist, points out that the People’s Party risks remaining an "elite party" if it fails to root itself in local regions, thereby missing the opportunity to broaden its support beyond Bangkok.

Finally, the Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai Party, which was second in 2023, has fallen to third place in 2026, losing 67 seats. It has effectively handed its role as the primary rival to the conservatives over to the People’s Party. Pheu Thai’s decline is likely a direct result of the Paetongtarn call controversy and the ensuing nationalist wave. However, given their lingering influence and the split-voting patterns in the Northeast, their future depends on their ability to offer compelling policies to their traditional base. Both the People’s Party and Pheu Thai now face the same homework: developing election strategies and policy pledges capable of countering a "smarter" version of authoritarianism that weaponizes unexpected variables like nationalism.